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概要書 
 
本研究では、企業の資本構成に与えるステークホルダーの影響について実証分析
を行なった。これまで、企業の資本構成に関する理論および実証研究は、アメリカ
やイギリスの企業を対象とした研究が数多くなされてきた。その標準的な考え方は
企業価値（株主価値のみ）を最大化することである。しかし、企業は、株主の他に、
従業員、マネージャーなどと言ったから構成しているために、彼らの利害も考慮す
る必要だと考えている。特に、日本の企業は株主の他に、全てのステークホルダー
の利害を考慮した上で、マネージャーが経営戦略を行っていると言われてきた。日
本企業は欧米と異なるいくつかの特徴をもっている。それらは、雇用システム（終
身雇用、年功序列、企業別労働組合）、企業とメインバンクの関係、株式の持合い
などがあげられる。このような違いから、日本企業の資本構成の決定要因について
も欧米企業と違いがあるのではないか。本研究の目的は、ステークホルダーが資本
構成に影響をもっているかどうかを考察する。更に、日本企業は実際にステークホ
ルダーを重視するか否かも明らかにしたい。 
本論文は、ステークホルダーを考慮して分析する理由は三つがある。第一に、資
本構成には全てのステークホルダーが影響を与えると考えている。現在まで資本構
成の決定に株主のみを考えて、他のステークホルダーを無視してきた。Modigliani 
& Miller（1958）の資本コストの論文を発表してから、資本構成に関する研究が
盛んに行なわれてきた。それらの理論や実証研究は、法人税及び所得税 [Miller 
(1977)]、倒産コスト [Baxter (1967)、Litzenberger (1973)、Scott (1976)、Waner 
(1977)、Haugen & Senbet (1978)]、エイジェンシー問題 [Jenson (1986)]を用い
たものが多かった。Miller (1977)は MM 理論（無税金の世界）を拡張し法人税及
び所得税を考慮した場合、企業は節税効果がゼロになるまで、社債を発行し続ける。
また、エイジェンシー問題の理論においては、主に株主とマネージャーのみの間に
生じた利害関係の問題を考慮する。マネージャーは、自分の良いマネージメントに
よって得た利益は 100％もらえるわけではないのに、経営危機の際全てのコストを
こうむることになる。例えば、交替されたり、評判が悪くなったりするのである。
それに対して株主はフリ ・ーキャッシュフローを減らすために負債比率を引き上げ
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たり、より多くのリターンを求めるため、高いリスクの投資をさせたりし、マネー
ジャーにプレッシャーをかけ、企業価値最大化するように努力をさせる。 
このように、一般的な資本構成の考え方は、企業は株主のみの価値を最大化する
と考える。しかし、企業の中に様々なステークホルダー（株主、マネージャー、従
業員、クライアント、サプライヤー）が存在しており、各当事者が会社に貢献して
いる。例えば、従業員が一生懸命に営業し、売上につながる。マネージャーは、優
れた経営戦略を実行し、会社の利益に貢献するなどである。従って、株主以外のス
テークホルダーが影響を持っているかどうかを考察する。 
第二に、日本企業はステークホルダーを重視するといわれている。資本構成の分
野において、現実にはステークホルダーを重視するかどうかを確かめたいのである。
日本企業は欧米企業と違って、様々な特徴があるため、資金調達行動も異なる可能
性がある。日本企業の特徴を見て行くと、雇用の面において、社員はある会社に入
社すれば、その会社で定年まで勤めるのが一般的である。給与や福利厚生も勤続年
数とともにあがる。そして、社員から部長、取締役あるいは社長の座に昇ることも
できる。そういったことから、会社は社員・マネージャーのものだともいえる。次
に、資金調達のとき、日本企業は主にメインバンクに頼る。メインバンクは企業に
融資する債権者でもあり、企業の大株主でもある。さらに、企業は経営難に陥って
も、メインバンクとの交渉しだいで、銀行が企業を助けたり、再生計画を実施した
りする。そのようなことから日本企業とメインバンクは緊密な関係をもっている。
また、株主構成をみれば、尐数株主の合計が約 20％に対して、安定株主（金融機
関保有率や関連会社の株式持合い率の合計）が約 40％である。株式持合いのメリ
ットは、長期的な関係･取引を築くこと、買収を防衛する有効な策などである。し
たがって、資本構成の決定要因も異なるかもしれない。例えば、アメリカの株主は、
負債比率を高くしたいのに対して、日本の株主はできるだけ負債比率を下げる。な
ぜならば、アメリカの株主は短期的なリターンを望む傾向があるから、負債を用い
ることによって生じた節税効果を最大限に求める。また、負債が多ければ、企業は
常に倒産の危機にさらされているので、マネージャーの自己利益経営や無駄遣い防
止にもなるからである。日本企業の場合、企業同士が互いの株式を持ち合って、リ
ターンや配当金よりも、むしろ長期かつ継続的な取引の方が望ましいであろうから、
負債比率を低くし、倒産を避けるのである。そういった目的の違いから、資本構成
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の決定も異なり、ステークホルダーは実際に影響を持っているかを調べる。 
第三に、ステークホルダーが資本構成に影響を与えるのであれば、どのステーク
ホルダーが、どれだけの影響を与えるかを分析したい。これまで、ステークホルダ
ーを用いた資本構成の理論は非常に尐ない。そのうち、Cornell & Shapiro (1987)
のステークホルダー理論とBarton、Hill & Sundaram（1989）のCornell & Shapiro 
(1987)のステークホルダー理論の実証分析があげられる。だが、彼らの理論と実証
分析は、マネージャー、従業員、クライアントやサプライヤーなどをステークホル
ダーという一つの変数として、分析を行なっていた。そのため、個々のステークホ
ルダーがどのような及びどれぐらいの影響力をもっているかはわからないのであ
る。ステークホルダーの影響力を明らかにすることによって、資本構成の決定要因
の解明に役立つと考えている。資本構成の議論は数十年なされてきたが、日本企業
を対象とした実証研究はわずかであることが現状である。そして、日本企業がステ
ークホルダー重視とされているにもかかわらず、ステークホルダーを考慮した資本
構成の実証研究はほとんど行なわれていない。 
研究仮説としては、 
1）マネージャー：マネージャーは自分の利益を最大にするため、負債比率を下
げる。マネージャーは、倒産を避けたいと言うモチベーションがある。なぜなら、
企業が倒産すれば、マネージャーはマネージャーとしてのポストを失い、名誉や評
判も悪くなるからである。 
2）株主：大株主は負債比率を上げる。理由は、負債を利用することにより節税
効果が得られるため、できるだけその節税効果を最大に求める。また、負債比率を
上げることはマネージャーの行動をモニターするためにもなる。負債を上げること
によって、倒産リスクが高まるのでマネージャーの無駄遣いを減らすことができ、
マネージャーの努力も高めることができる。 
3）従業員：長期雇用を有する企業ほど、負債比率と負の関係がある。日本はい
まだ終身雇用のシステムが存在し、企業が安定した雇用を保障できなければ、優秀
な人材を確保できなくなる。就職する者から見れば、倒産しそうな企業には就職し
たくないからである。また、従業員の退職給与引当金は負債比率と負の関係がある。
企業が倒産すれば、従業員の退職金や年金などが削減される可能性があるので、低
い負債比率の企業ほど望ましい。 
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4）クライアント及びサプライヤー：取引先が集中している企業ほど、負債比率
と負の関係を持つ。それは、倒産した場合、クライアントにとって、突然取引でき
なくなるあるいは発注した商品やサービスが受取ることができなくなると、自分の
顧客に新商品やサービスを提供できなくなる可能性があるので、そのコストをこう
むることになるからである。また、サプライヤーの立場から見れば、注文した製品
やサービスを受取ってもらえないあるいは、売った商品の代金を受取れないのであ
る。したがって、倒産しそうな企業と取引したくないと考えるであろう。 
以上の仮説を実証するために、東京証券取引所に上場している一部上場企業を用
いて分析を行なった。負債比率は、固定負債合計を固定負債合計と資本合計の和で
割ったものであり、ステークホルダーの説明変数は、株主（SH）、マネージャー
（MH）、従業員（EMP、TKH）、クライアント（CLT）及びサプライヤー（SUP）
である。そして、コントロール変数として、Log(sale)、（総売上）、PR（収益率）、
FIXAR（有形固定資産比率）、及び AGE（設立年数）を用いる。 
SH、MH と EMP はそれぞれ、第一大株主の持株比率、マネージャーの持株比
率、平均勤続年数である。TKH は退職給与引当金を資産合計で割ったものである。
また、CLT は受取手形と売掛金の和を総売上で割ったもの、そして SUP は支払手
形と買掛金の和を総売上で割ったものである。 
使用したデータは 2002 年度から 2007 年度の 6 年間である。各年度のサンプル
数はそれぞれ、1099、1113、1134、1142、1100、1158 である。分析サンプルに
入れた企業は二つの条件を満たすものである。一つは、全ての変数の値を持ってい
ること。もう一つは、各年度において、3 月に決算を行なった企業であることであ
る。 
 分析方法として、最小二乗法を用いて以下の式の回帰分析を行なった。 
 
DR＝a0 + a1SH + a2EMP +a3TKH + a4MH + a5CLT + a6SUP + a7Log(sale)       
+ a8PR + a9FIXAR + a10AGE + U  ( I ) 
 
DR＝a0 + a1SH + a2SH*SH + a3EMP +a4TKH + a5MH + a6MH*MH + a7CLT      
+ a8SUP + a9Log(sale) + a10PR + a11FIXAR + a12AGE + U  ( II ) 
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本研究の分析結果は次のようになる： 
1）第一大株主の持株比率は負債比率と負の関係をもっている。日本企業の第一
株主は一般的に株式持合いの関連会社であり、短期よりも長期的な関係を望んでい
る。そのために、短期的なリターンよりも、長期的かつ安定的な配当の方が好まし
い。また、企業が倒産する場合、株価価値がなくなる上に、将来の取引もできなく
なるので、そのコストが大きい。したがって、倒産を避けるために、負債比率を下
げるインセンティブをもっているのである。この点において、アメリカ企業の株主
と比較すると異なる行動をとっていることがわかった。アメリカ企業の株主は、企
業との取引関係を持っておらず、単に投資家としてキャピタルゲインや配当金を求
める。負債を上げることよって、節税効果を最大に求められ、マネージャーにプレ
ッシャーをかけることもできるのである。 
2）マネージャーの持株比率は負債比率と負の関係を持っている。仮説通りに、
日本のマネージャーにとって倒産コストは大きいのである。マネージャーのほとん
どが内部昇進のため、企業が倒産すると、従業員からマネージャーになるまでの努
力が無駄になってしまうため、それを避けたいのである。 
(I)式の推計では、SH が半分、MH が全部有意ではなかったが、(II)式で再推計
するとほとんどが有意になっている。そして、株主とマネージャーの持株比率があ
る一定の水準に達すると、負債比率に対して正の関係になる。つまり、株主とマネ
ージャーは負債比率に関して二次関数の関係をもっている。 
3） 全ての期間において EMP は有意ではなかったため、平均勤続年数は負債比
率の決定とは無関係であるという結果になる。TKH の係数は有意で、負債比率と
負の関係になっている。よって、従業員の利害を考慮する企業は負債比率を下げる
のである。しかし、従業員は負債比率に与える影響が他のステークホルダーに比べ
ると一番小さいのである。 
4）クライアント(CLT)は仮説通りにその係数が負になっているが、サプライヤ
ー(SUP)の係数は仮説とは逆の符号になっている。その理由としては、CLT の交渉
力(Bargaining Power) が SUP より有利であることが考えられる。クライアント
はたくさんの企業の中から健全な企業としか取引しないと言う選択権を有する。そ
れに対して、サプライヤーは企業に選ばれる立場であるから、企業との交渉力は弱
いのである。よって、企業の負債比率が高くても取引を続けるだろう。その点に関
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しては更に検証する必要がある。 
5）最後に、全てのコントロール変数（総売上、収益率、有形固定資産比率、及
び設立年数）は、有意かつ標準の資本構成理論の予想符号と一致したので、アメリ
カの企業と同様に日本企業に対しても説得力があると言える。この結果は Hirota 
(1999)のバブル経済崩壊前の実証結果とも一致している。 
本研究の実証結果によれば、資本構成の決定にステークホルダーの影響が見られ
るが、本研究にはまだいくつかの限界があり、さらに検証していかなければならな
い。まず、分析に用いた企業は製造業及び非製造業を含んだものの、ほとんどが日
本を代表する大手企業（売上額、資本金、従業員の数など）であったため、中小企
業に対して、同様に説明できるかどうかは更に実証分析をしなければならない。 
次に、回帰式の中に債権者（銀行など）が含まれていなかった。大手企業は債券
市場などからも資金調達できるが、中小企業の大半はそういった資金調達手段をも
っていないため、銀行からの融資が最も重要である。さらに、銀行や証券会社は融
資する他に、企業の大株主でもあるため、普通の株主と異なる行動をとるかもしれ
ない。したがって、ステークホルダーに債権者も考慮する必要があると考えられる。 
また、ステークホルダーの変数である株主、マネージャー、従業員、クライアン
ト、サプライヤーはそれぞれ、持株比率、退職給与引当金、受取手形・売掛金、支
払手形・買掛金を用いたが、果たしてそれらの変数は本当にステークホルダーの代
理変数として妥当であるかどうかは疑問が残っている。 
それに、SUP 変数が全ての期間において有意であったが、仮説とは逆の符号に
なっている。SUP はサプライヤーの代理変数として不適切だったかもしれない。
よって、企業とサプライヤーの関係についてより深く調べる必要がある。最後に、
本研究の分析において、クロス・セクション･データを用いたが、パネル・データ
を利用する場合同様の結果が得られるかについても確かめなければならない。 
 
本研究の実証結果から結論をいうと、日本企業の資本構成には株主の他にステー
クホルダーが有意な影響を与えている。従って、資本構成を議論する際、株主価値
だけ最大化するのではなく、全てのステークホルダーの価値を最大化するように考
えていくと合理的である。 
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I- Background of the Study 
 
1) Special Characteristics of Japanese Corporations 
 
Japanese corporations have many special characteristics which are different 
from other developed capitalist countries especially, the United States and United 
Kingdom where most financial theories have been developed. These features 
seemingly deviated from the shareholder-oriented and liberal market principles. A 
great amount of researches show that Japanese firms competitive advantage after 
the World War II seemed not to rely on the efficiency of the market but the 
organizational efficiency of the firm generated by all stakeholders in developing 
and maintaining firm-specific strengths. These differences are characterized by the 
features of Japanese firms and that of the corporate governance, such as 
employment system and industrial relationship (including lifetime employment, 
seniority based payment, in-house labor union), main bank based relationship and 
ownership structure (cross-shareholding). 
A corporation is considered as a community of people where employees’ interest 
play a predominant role. An employee who enters a firm upon graduation is 
expected to work for that firm until retirement. He will be offered firm-specific 
skills training upon entering the firm and the company will maintain a flexible 
movement of human resource within the firm or to related firms. The firm also 
provides promotion opportunities, salary and benefit packages according to the 
length of time in serving the firm. Therefore, average tenure of office is also high 
and mid-career hiring remains low. Most firms’ president is often promoted within 
the firm rather than the representative of shareholders. The board of directors may 
grow up to 20 or 30 members, but almost all of them have been promoted 
internally through the ranks of the company as an employee [Miyajima (2007, Ch 
12)]. As long as the firm does not go bankrupt, he can enjoy the job security and 
have no worry of being dismissed. However, if the firm goes bankrupt, this is costly 
because, Japanese firms usually employ only new graduate, thus make job 
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switching difficult and rarely happened before the fall of Japan’s golden economy 
era. Furthermore, the in-house labor union also plays an important role in the 
Japanese firms. It represents employees when negotiating wages, protects 
employees from downsizing plans, and when labor conflicts happen; it does not 
stand against the employer but acts as a mediator between employees and 
employer to solve the conflict. This is different from most countries where there 
are big labor unions comprise of many firms in the same industry rather than 
within each firm.  
For financing, Japanese firms rely heavily on their main bank (the biggest bank 
a firm has transaction with) for receiving loans and for borrowing to finance their 
projects. This is due to the existence of many financial regulations and rules which 
restrict firms from issuing bonds and equity. Thus, firms that do not meet the 
requirements for issuing depend on the bank. This is crucial, particularly to those 
firms that don’t have access to financial markets for finance. In some firms, main 
banks not only lend but also hold the firm’s equity. Debt and equity were usually 
concentrated with a small number of banks that made up the largest blocks of 
Japanese firms. Main bank plays an important role as an effective monitor on 
management on behalf of shareholders and other banks. Besides offering credit, 
main bank also extended its role by providing financial services and advice to 
maintain long-term relationship with clients. Those services include payment 
settle accounts, bonds issue related services, information services and supply of 
management consulting services [Aoki, Patrick and Sheard (1994, Ch 1)]. In 
addition, when a firm performance declines or faces financial distress, the main 
bank intervenes as a delegated member of the board and is active in corporate 
rescues by bailing out the firm or restructuring the firm. This relationship 
mechanism avoids expensive formal bankruptcy procedures and safeguards the 
firm from formal liquidation that affects long-term business relation with suppliers, 
clients or employees [Jackson and Miyajima (2007, Ch 1)].  
Furthermore, the ownership structure of a Japanese firm is characterized by the 
so called “stable shareholders” (cross-shareholding plus shares held by long-term 
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investors such as financial institutions or related business firms) who hold 
inter-firm shares among corporations and banks. Generally, the main bank is one 
of the largest shareholders of a firm but does not exceed 5% (under the provisions 
of Article 11 of the Japanese Anti-monopoly Act prohibits banks and insurance 
companies from holding up over five per cent of a firm’s shares). In contrast, small 
reciprocal cross-shareholding typically accounts for 20% and stable shareholding 
accounts for over 40% of shares [Kester (1992)]. This ownership ties form a stable 
network of long-term business relationships among corporation groups which 
include both the bank-based horizontal keiretsu such as the Sumitomo group, and 
the vertical structure keiretsu such as the buyer-supplier relationship in the 
automobile industry. There are many merits of this cross-shareholding, for 
example, stable shareholders can protect the firm from hostile takeover or 
short-term shocks of the financial markets such as the fall of share prices. In 
return, they expect long-term grow in share prices and dividends as well as future 
business. At the same time, institutional investors such as insurance companies 
did not exist until early 1990s after the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy.  
These features of Japanese firms and corporate governance mentioned above 
may suggest that Japanese corporations behave differently than companies in 
other countries, particularly on the aspect of financing. Firm’s wealth (or 
shareholders value) maximization is the standard corporate finance theory. 
However, Japanese firms seem to act differently, because a firm is considered as a 
community of people, thus all stakeholders’ interest is concerned rather than just 
that of the shareholders [Yoshimori (1995)]. In Yoshimori (1995), he argued that: 
 
“The central characteristic of the Japanese pluralistic concept is the alignment 
of the company’s goals and interests with those of the stakeholders. This leads to 
a higher degree of cohesion between the firm’s stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, 
management, employees, the main bank, major suppliers and distributors. They 
pull together toward a common purpose: the company’s survival and prosperity 
(pp. 34)”.  
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For this reason, financial decision in Japanese firms may also differ and are 
unique compared to other countries. A closer examination into Japanese firms’ 
financial decisions may yield interesting results. 
 
2) The Changes of Japanese Corporations and Financial Deregulations 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Japanese firms have several special 
corporate finance characteristics which differ from those of the United States such 
as main bank relationship, cross-shareholding and unique employment system 
such as lifetime employment and seniority based wages. However, many changes 
have occurred when Japan faced economic recession after the fall of the bubble 
economy in early 1990s, such as changes in ownership structure, bank crisis and 
deregulations in the financial market in 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
A) Changes in Ownership Structure 
 
One obvious change in Japanese firms’ structure is the growing impact of 
foreign investors into Japanese financial markets from late 1990s. In 2000, foreign 
investors owned 13% of total shares listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
increased to 25.5% in 2007 or 18.6% to 28% respectively in term of market value 
(TSE various years). Transactions made by foreign investors accounted for just 
9.8% in 1990 but 34.3% in 2005. The appearance of foreign investors thus plays a 
key role in the market movement and, to some extend, changes the mechanism of 
stable shareholders and cross-shareholding among firms. Among large Japanese 
firms, they have shifted from relying only on bank loans toward corporate bonds 
which targeted foreign and institutional investors. Meanwhile, stable and 
cross-shareholders have decreased considerably. For example, stable shareholders 
and cross-shareholders accounted for 40.1% and 15% in 1990 but fell to just 26% 
and 7.2% respectively in 2002 [Kuroki (2003)]. The foreign investors may 
influence and put pressure for changes in Japanese corporate finance and 
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governance but not it is sufficient to explain these phenomena. One reason is that 
the proportion of the firm exposed to foreign investors, listing requirements and 
bonds rating remains small [Jackson and Miyajima (2007, Ch 1)], [see also 
Ahmadijian (2007, Ch 4)]. 
 
B) Financial Deregulations and Changes in Bank-Firm Relationship 
 
Financial deregulations’ process in Japan had gradually been spanning from the 
mid 1970s to the mid 1990s in the so-called deregulation big bang [Toya (2006)]. 
After the oil shock and the widening of public debt in 1970s, in 1977, the 
government deregulated the secondary market for government bonds. Since then, 
criteria for issuing bonds also were loosened. The bonds market also benefits from 
the abandon of interest rate control and the stop of controlling on foreign 
exchange as well as the development of new financial products. In addition, 
deregulations further allowed firms to issue bonds at market price. All these 
factors led to the increase of equity finance particularly during the bubble period of 
late 1980s when stock market reached its peak. As a result, large firms began to 
increase external funds by directly issuing corporate bonds or equity and often 
refinance bank loans with this funding. Japanese bonds also benefit from very low 
interest rate in Japan that makes bonds more attractive to fund foreign expansion.  
The growing of financial choices for Japanese firms also led to the erosion of the 
relationship between the main bank and the firm. In spite of the deregulations of 
bond issuing rules in the mid 1990s, the overall firms still depend on bank 
borrowing. While large firms have loosened their ties with the main bank by 
beginning to finance themselves through bonds or equity, small and medium size 
firms that lack the ability to access to bonds market have become even more 
dependent on borrowing from banks [Arikawa and Miyajima (2005)]. During the 
bubble years of 1987-1990, large Japanese corporations had a net surplus of funds; 
thus aggregate bank lending to large manufacturing firms also slowed. Therefore, 
banks compensated this decline of loans to large borrowers by starting to lend to 
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new clients with higher risk particularly venture construction firms during the land 
price boom period. Following the collapse of the Japanese stock market in the 
early 1990s and the slow down in macroeconomic stagnation, Japanese banks 
suffered losses on stock buying during the bubble period and remained holding a 
huge legacy of non-performing loans (NPL). At its peak in March 2002, major 
banks such as city banks, trust banks and long-term credit banks held ¥28.4 
trillion or 9.6% of outstanding loans. However, this was reduced to ¥7.6 trillion or 
3.2% following the passage of the Financial Revitalization Program in October 
2002. Therefore, main banks not only faced their own financial distress and loss of 
large firms as clients but also became less effective in the governance relationship 
in the remaining firms [Jackson and Miyajima (2007, Ch 1)].  
 
C) Employment and Payment System 
 
The undergone substantial changes since the mid 1990s have put new pressure 
on employees. The erosion of banks’ ability in monitoring a firm and the increase 
in ownership of institutional and foreign investors in Japanese firms have exposed 
firms to greater pressure from the financial markets to produce higher return for 
shareholders. The trend of becoming more shareholder-oriented may lead to the 
conflict of interests with stakeholders, particularly employees. First, shareholders 
may demand the firm to focus on profitable business portfolio; therefore, disinvest 
or close of non-profitable business units that were used as diversified strategy to 
maintain employment. Second, shareholders may pressure the firm to adopt 
performance-oriented pay to link employee incentive with business unit 
performance, and managerial stock options may also lead to the issue of income 
inequality. Finally, shareholders may demand higher return through higher 
dividends.  
However, Jackson (2007, Ch 10) used data from the survey made by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on the corporate system and 
employment found that, over 80% of firms still continue their commitment to 
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lifetime employment. Nevertheless, only 8% keep the traditional seniority-based 
pay system, while 43% adopted wage payment based on individual performance or 
moved to a more complicated payment system which combines both seniority 
based payment and performance-oriented payment. At the same time, he found no 
significant impact of foreign ownership on the employment system. One 
explanation is that external market pressure could be less importance than insider 
style of corporate governance in determining employment patterns.  
Despite of the changes in wage system which has moved from traditional 
Japanese seniority based payment to a combination of traditional seniority based 
payment and merit payment that is close to that of the Anglo-American system, 
lifetime employment still exists and remains one of the internal features of 
Japanese corporations.  
 
D) Bankruptcy 
 
Until the early 1990s, Japanese main banks had been providing more effective 
private alternatives to bankruptcy reorganization at a lower cost to financially 
distressed firms as well as debt restructuring. Bankruptcy resolutions were rarely 
happen for large Japanese firms since most large firms facing financial distress 
usually negotiated privately with their main bank to restructure debts rather than 
filing for formal bankruptcy procedures. However, after mid 1990s, banks were 
less likely to rescue financially distressed firms than they were in the past [Hirota 
and Miyajima (2001)]. Consequently, the number of firms filing for legal 
bankruptcy has increased. As a response, the Civil Rehabilitation Law was passed 
and took effect in April 2000 to facilitate and encourage managers to file for 
bankruptcy at an early stage under Rehabilitation Law by reducing their personal 
burdens. In addition, Civil Rehabilitation Law also simplifies the bankruptcy 
restructuring since secured creditors do not take part in the procedure [see also Xu 
(2007, Ch 6)]. As a result of restructuring, the bankrupt firms may restructure 
their business portfolio by giving up low profit or lost business units and downsize 
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labor force to cut labor cost. In these cases, employees will strongly be affected by 
wage cuts or higher risk of being dismissed.  
Changes in Japanese corporations such as ownership structure, main bank 
relationship, financial deregulations and employment system lead to the 
co-existence of traditional J form (the continuing of lifetime employment, 
dependency on banks for finance, high level of cross-shareholding etc.), and an 
hybrid pattern based on market-oriented finance and ownership characteristics 
(institutional and foreigner, more transparent disclosure, alongside with relative 
lower level of bank loan and cross-shareholding). All these changes expose firms to 
get more pressure from the financial markets thus moving towards a more liberal 
market-oriented strategy by promoting shareholders’ value. As a result, this 
provokes more conflicts with other stakeholders, particularly regular employees, 
managers, clients and suppliers.  
 
3) Shareholder-Oriented Capital Structure Theory 
 
In most capital structure theories, the primary focus is on how to maximize 
shareholders’ value. In the study of capital structure by Modigliani and Miller 
(MM) in 1958, pointed out that in the perfect market which taxes and transaction 
costs do not exist, the firm value is independent from its capital structure. 
Following this study, a great number of theories and empirical studies have been 
developed to determine the determinants of capital structure. Among those, taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and agency problems dominated the field. Miller (1977) extended 
the MM model by including corporate and personal taxes stated that a firm issues 
bonds until it reaches the point (optimal) where tax saving effect becomes zero.  
Bankruptcy costs have been used, for example, by Baxter (1967), Litzenberger 
(1973) and Scott (1976) to explain the choice between debt and equity. However, 
the significance of these costs was disputed by Warner (1977) and Haugen and 
Senbet (1978). Warner, in a study of railroads bankruptcy found that the direct 
bankruptcy costs were small thus cannot explain capital structure choice. On the 
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other hand, Haugen and Senbet pointed out that, indirect costs associate only with 
firms going out of business, in other word, liquidating. They urged that debt 
holders and stockholders agree that the firm should liquidate whenever the 
operating value is lower than the liquidating value.  
In most agency theories, the main concern is on the conflict between managers 
and shareholders. Managers do not capture the entire gain from their profit 
enhancing management because they do not hold 100% of the residual claim in the 
firm. In stead, they bear the entire cost that result from their management. For 
example, in case of bankruptcy, they will at least loss their reputation and the 
benefit of being a manager at that firm. Shareholders, on the other hand demand 
more return by pushing manager to invest in a risky but high return project. As 
pointed out by Jenson (1986), debt payment reduces the amount of free cash flow 
available for mangers to engage in project that transfer firm resources to their own 
interests. At the same time higher debt means higher probability of bankruptcy, 
thus if managers are sensitive to factors such as reputation, then they will put more 
effort in managing the firm to generate higher shareholder value.  
In sum, the theories regarding strategy uses in financial decision such as taxes, 
bankruptcy costs or agency problems are all converge to maximize only 
shareholders’ value. In reality, a firm consists of many stakeholders such as 
managers, employees, clients and suppliers. Managers and employees are those 
who work hard to generate high sales, raise profit and so on for the firm while 
clients and suppliers are the two pillars supporting firm’s sustainability. 
Shareholders’ liability is limited and their investments are generally diversified 
thus even in the event of bankruptcy, their loss is limited. In contrast, a firm’s 
liquidation can impose costs on its stakeholders [Titman (1984)]. For example, 
employees will lose their job and as a result this may also affect their entire family. 
Clients (or suppliers) may not be able to obtain the product, parts or services. 
Therefore, in addition to shareholders, stakeholders should also be considered in 
the financial decision.  
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4) Purpose of the Study 
 
The reason for choosing to study the impact of stakeholders on capital structure 
and the use of Japanese firms in the empirical test is because: 
First, stakeholders shall be considered in firm’s financial decision. As mentioned 
in the previous section, almost all capital structure theories focus only on how to 
maximize shareholder’s value, ignoring other stakeholders, particularly employees, 
managers, suppliers and clients. In the circumstances of financial distress, 
shareholders may exit from the investment, liquidating or in the worse case losing 
stake in the firm. However, stakeholders bear expensive costs such as the loss of 
jobs (employees), the loss of reputation and/or the loss of management post 
(managers), inability to obtain promised products or services and loss of future 
business (suppliers or clients). Since a firm is a community of people, therefore, all 
parties’ value should be maximized not just that of shareholders. Adding 
stakeholders in the capital structure decision may lead to a new interpretation of 
capital structure theory.  
Second, Japanese firms’ managers tend to maximize all stakeholders’ value 
(including themselves) rather than just shareholders’ value [Kester (1991)]. 
Therefore, this is a good chance to examine whether the basic factors used to 
explain capital structure in shareholder-oriented theory are also applicable in 
explaining stakeholder-oriented firms.  
Third, as mentioned earlier, Japanese firms have possessed many features that 
are unique to other countries such as ownership structure, bank-firm relationship 
and employment system. These features have still remained although Japanese 
firms have experienced corporate finance and governance changes since the mid 
1990s from bank-oriented to market-oriented. With these special characteristics 
(co-existence of the traditional J form and the hybrid between J form and 
Anglo-American), it can be suggested that Japanese firms’ financial behavior may 
also be different form those of Anglo-American firms. For example, shareholders 
in the United States may increase debt to reduce free cash flow in order to prevent 
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the manager from building his empire, while Japanese shareholder may decrease 
debt to avoid bankruptcy.  
Finally, in spite of continuing theoretical debate on corporate capital structure, 
there are relatively little empirical studies focusing on Japanese firms especially 
the relationship between stakeholders and capital structure decision. In addition, 
Cornell and Shapiro (1987); Barton et al (1989) have discussed the impact of 
stakeholder on debt ratio using American firms, but they did not clearly detail 
which stakeholders (shareholders, managers, employees, clients and suppliers) 
and to what extent each of them have an impact on the debt ratio decision. This 
study aims to take a closer look at the impact of stakeholders, which include 
shareholders, managers, employees, clients and suppliers, on debt ratio and make 
a brief comparison between the two countries. 
 
II- Introduction 
 
Japanese firms are said to maximize all stakeholders’ wealth rather than just 
shareholders’. Due to this special characteristic, Japanese firms may decide their 
capital structure differently from other developed countries.  
Which stakeholders have an influence on firm capital structure decision? How 
and to what extent? Are capital structure theories developed in the United States 
also compatible in explaining Japanese firms? This paper is trying to provide 
empirical answers to these questions and explain how Japanese firms decide their 
financial structure based on stakeholders consideration. 
A firm’s capital structure decision is one of the most important topics in 
corporate finance and many theories and empirical studies have been conducted in 
the United States over the past few decades about this subject. Dating back to the 
study by Modigliani and Miller (1958) concerning the cost of capital and optimal 
capital structure, it is said that in the absence of taxes, the firm’s value does not 
differ at all between leveraged and unleveraged firms. However, such consumption 
is far beyond reality because taxes do exist. Later studies have been extended to 
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range from models based on agency costs [Jensen and Meckling (1976)], models 
based on asymmetric information [Ross (1977)], to models based on stakeholders 
[Cornell and Shapiro (1987); Barton et al (1989)]. However, both the theoretical 
and empirical studies are most developed to fit with United States firms. This 
raises the question that whether such findings also applicable with other countries 
where corporate governance, accounting and financial regulations are different 
from that of the United States. Such factors, therefore, may affect a firm’s decision 
to choose its finance between debt and equity.  
In Japan, there are some empirical researches on capital structure.  
Prowse (1990) observed the determinants of capital structure based on agency 
problems between debt holders and shareholders of Japanese and United States 
firms. Japanese institutional investors are large shareholders in the firm they lend 
particularly in firms more capable of being affected with agency problems, while in 
the United States law restricted institutional investors from doing so. He found 
that the leverage of United States firms is negatively related to agency factors 
whereas Japanese firms show no such relation. He explained this finding as 
meaning that the agency problems decrease to a great level as a result of effective 
monitoring by financial institutions.  
However, Rajan and Zingles (1995), who compared the capital structure in the 
G-7 countries, argued that determinants which affect United States firms’ debt 
ratio are found significant in Japanese firms as well. However, a deeper 
examination into the institutional differences is necessary in order to indentify the 
fundamental determinants of capital structure. Therefore, with these different 
findings we still do not have a common agreement on the theory of Japanese firms’ 
capital decision. This lead to another empirical research by Hirota (1999) using 
both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies listed on the first section of 
Tokyo Stock Exchange to test, first, if basic factors in capital structure theories 
developed in the United States (market-oriented economy) are also valid to 
Japanese firms (bank-oriented economy). Second, he tested whether institutional 
and regulatory factors existing in Japanese capital market can affect a firm’s 
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financial decision. As a result, he found some interesting results regarding 
Japanese firms. Basic determinants of leverage in United States firms and 
institutional and regulatory factors in Japan both have significant effect on capital 
structure decision in Japanese firms.  
From the above studies we can conclude that institutional regulations and 
corporate governance system differences do affect a firm’s financial behavior. 
However, it is said that Japanese firms’ objective is to maximize all stakeholders’ 
wealth. From this point of view, stakeholders are thought to have more or less 
impact on capital structure as well. Therefore, in addition to real factors in capital 
structure theories, in this paper, I conducted an empirical test to study the impact 
of stakeholders on debt ratio. 
The remaining parts are structured as follows. Chapter III makes a brief review 
of previous studies on the relationship between stakeholders and capital structure. 
Chapter IV presents the hypotheses. Chapter V explains the variable and data used 
in the analysis. Chapter VI discusses the estimated results while chapter VII 
presents the robustness check. Chapter VIII discusses the limitation of this paper 
and some future study suggestions and chapter XI is the conclusion of this paper.  
 
III- A Review of Previous Studies 
 
1) Cornell and Shapiro (1987) 
 
  Cornell and Shapiro developed a theory to study the relationship between 
stakeholders and firm’s financial decision. They concluded that stakeholders play a 
very important role in a firm’s capital structure decision. This is because a firm is a 
collective of various claims held by different parties, thus maximizing of a firm’s 
value is subject to the consideration of non-investor stakeholders. From this point 
of view, a firm’s claimants go beyond explicit claimants (debt holders and 
shareholders) to include implicit claimants (suppliers, clients or consumers, 
employees, managers and so on) who play a very important role in financial 
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decision and serve as a key to explain the problems in financial theory, especially a 
firm’s financing policy.  
  Claims such as product warranty and wage contracts that a firm provides to 
stakeholders are called explicit claims and claims such as after-service to 
customers and job security to employees are called implicit claims. Since explicit 
claims have higher priority than implicit claims, if default risk is small and only 
explicit claims are of concern, implicit claims are meaningless. Thus, this cannot 
explain the changes in a firm’s wealth and stakeholders’ relation; that is, in the 
condition of no bankruptcy risk, then stakeholders’ claims are not important 
[Titman (1984)].  
Cornell and Shapiro use the concept of net organizational capital (NOC) as the 
firm’s only expected positive net present value to measure a firm’s wealth and as a 
proxy to examine stakeholders’ relationship with firm’s financial decision. NOC is 
the difference between organizational assets (OC), the present value of expected 
future implicit claims sells to stakeholders (e.g. consumers) and organizational 
liabilities (OL), the present value of the cost to honor its payout for future implicit 
claims to stakeholders. The higher the positive NOC, the higher the firm’s wealth 
will increase. A firm’s value depends on the sale of implicit claims to its 
stakeholders. The selling price of implicit claim depends on the financial condition 
of the firm. Therefore, A firm which relies heavily on sale of future implicit claims 
should lower its debt ratio to avoid default risk by issuing equity instead of bonds, 
though equity financing is costly compared to bonds [Myers (1984)]. This is 
because if a firm faces financial distress, the payout on implicit claims will also be 
cut considerably and this affects all stakeholders’ interests. When stakeholders 
doubt its ability to payout future explicit claims, they will buy at a lower price or 
they will refuse to buy those claims at all which leads to the decrease of a firm’s 
wealth.  
Therefore firms must consider stakeholders as an important factor in their 
financial decision to show the firm’s utmost honor in paying out future implicit 
claims. This means that stakeholders do affect a firm’s financial decision. 
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2) Barton, Hill and Sundaram (1989) 
 
Based on Cornell and Shapiro’s stakeholder theory, Barton et al conducted an 
empirical study to examine the efficiency of stakeholder theory in interpreting 
capital structure decision in a firm. They tested the hypothesis that a firm with 
high NOC should finance itself with equity; that is, lower its debt ratio. They found 
that the stakeholder variable has significant negative impact on debt ratio.  
In Cornell and Shapiro’s stakeholder theory, they use NOC as a proxy for 
examining stakeholders’ impact on capital structure. However, NOC and claims 
are not directly priced nor traded in any market so their value cannot be 
conjectured. Therefore, they use the concept of related firm and unrelated firm to 
express a firm’s NOC. A related firm is a firm that produces or sells closely related 
products, has similar stakeholders (suppliers and clients) with the same trade 
mark or market, whereas an unrelated (diversified) firm is a firm which has many 
lines of businesses with many different stakeholders and market channels. Their 
hypothesis is that a related firm has higher level of NOC because such firm’s 
business is not diversified and highly correlated so a failure in one product may 
lead to the failure of all its businesses; therefore, such a firm will be motivated to 
honor implicit claims in the future. While an unrelated firm has relatively low NOC 
because stakeholders will doubt if the firm will payout future implicit claims since 
the spillover effect in this kind of firms is relatively small because a failure in one 
business could hardly affect the others. Thus, it has less incentive to honor 
stakeholders’ implicit claims in low profit or lost businesses. Hence, the debt ratio 
in related firms is expected to be lower than that in unrelated firms. 
They performed a cross-sectional study of 179 United State firms (119 related 
and 60 unrelated firms) from 1970-1974. For the whole period, the proxy variable 
of NOC was significant and negative as predicted in the hypothesis. This gives 
supports for stakeholders’ effect of NOC on debt ratio.  
However, their sample size was small and comprised of only big companies and 
the proxy for NOC was unclear whether it is an appropriate proxy for stakeholders. 
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Therefore, we cannot generalize their finding to be valid for all the firms in an 
economy. 
 
3) Friend and Lang (1988) 
 
Friend and Lang provided an empirical test of managerial influence on firm’s 
financial decision. They asserted that capital structure decision is in part motivated 
by managerial self-interest. They have shown that managerial shareholding has 
negative impact on debt ratio which means that managers have no incentive to 
diversify risk compared to public investors to maintain a low debt ratio in order to 
avoid bankruptcy costs even if this is conflict with shareholders’ interests. This 
leverage level may lower than the optimal level that maximizes a firm’s value. In 
this kind of firms, debt ratio will remain low unless there is a non-managerial 
principal shareholder who effectively monitors the managers’ performance and 
prevents managers from building his empire using the firm’s resources. As a result 
of this effective monitoring, the existence of a non-managerial principal 
shareholder may also solve the conflict of interest between managerial and public 
shareholders by adjusting debt ratio that is close to the optimal level. 
In their study, they used the ownership of shares held by managerial insiders to 
test the hypothesis that the capital structure of a firm is determined in part by 
optimizing of managerial insiders’ interests even when these interests conflict with 
shareholders’ interests. That is, the higher the ownership of managerial insiders, 
the lower the debt ratio of a firm will be. This is because if managers also bear the 
bankruptcy costs (lose their stake and management position), they have the 
incentive to lower debt ratio that is less than the optimum to reduce the 
bankruptcy risk which may result from high debt financing. Another hypothesis is 
that, if a firm has a non-managerial principal shareholder, the debt ratio is 
expected to be higher than where such investors do not exist. This is because the 
effective monitoring by a n0n-managerial principal shareholder can limit the 
managers’ ability to adjust debt ratio by their own interests. 
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In their tests to analyze the effect of manager’s ability to adjust the debt ratio 
among different firms, they divided the firms into two categories depend on the 
percentage held by managers and the existence of non-managerial principal 
shareholders. The first category is “closely held” (CHC), which further subdivided 
into CHH1 and CHC0, closely held by management with and without 
non-managerial principal shareholders respectively. The second category is 
“publicly held” (PHC), which is subdivided into PHC1 and PHC0, publicly held 
with and without non-managerial principal shareholders respectively.  
They found that, in CHC firms, manager’s ownership has significantly negative 
impact on debt ratio regardless the existence of a non-managerial principal 
shareholder. This means that managers have the ability and desire to lower debt 
ratio to avoid bankruptcy. Meanwhile, in PHC1 firms, the negative impact still exist 
but at a lower level which reflect that managers have less ability to adjust debt ratio 
in a firm where their ownership is small and non-managerial principal 
shareholders exist. However, in PHC0, the debt ratio increases as the percentage of 
management holding increases. They explained this result as that, in the absence 
of both signal, sufficient ownership of managers and possible monitoring from 
non-managerial principal shareholders, a new signal is needed. For example, the 
managers may increase the debt ratio to ensure the dispersed shareholders about 
their quality in managing the firm. 
 
The above previous studies can be summarized as follow: 
Stakeholders (clients, suppliers, employees, etc.) have a significant negative 
relationship with debt ratio. While the ownership of insider managers also has a 
negative impact and shareholders have a positive relationship with the debt ratio. 
The next section is based on these findings and takes a closer step to evaluate the 
relationship between stakeholders and a firm’s financial decision by using 
Japanese corporations’ data. 
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IV Research Hypotheses 
 
1) Hypotheses 
 
In the shareholder-oriented capital structure theory, only shareholders are the 
most concerned. However, since a firm is a community of people, each party’s 
claims should be considered. As in the stakeholder theory pointed out by Cornell 
and Shapiro (1987), said that the corporate capital structure is in part depended on 
the role of non-investor stakeholders. Based on both theories which subject to the 
consideration of both shareholders and stakeholders, I constructed the following 
hypotheses to test the impact of each party on debt ratio: 
 
H1: Managers: the higher the proportion of insider managerial holding, the 
lower the debt ratio will be. 
H2: Shareholders: the higher the percentage of non-managerial principal 
shareholders, the higher the debt ratio will be. 
H3: Employees: the longer the long term employment system a firm possesses, 
the lower its debt ratio will be. 
H4: Also represents employees: The higher reserve of Taishoku Kyuyo 
Hikiatekin (accrued employee retirement benefit) a firm has, the more negative the 
impact on debt ratio will be. 
H5: Clients and Suppliers: The higher level of concentrated trading partners a 
firm has, the lower debt ratio will be. 
 
2) Hypotheses Explanation: 
 
H1: Friend and Lang (1988) reported that managers also bear losses in case of 
bankruptcy; therefore, to avoid these costs, they have the incentive to adjust debt 
ratio that is lower than the optimal level to fit their own interest even this is in 
conflict with the shareholders interests. Japanese firms are said to give 
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stakeholders priority to shareholders and likely to take a strategy which will 
maximize all stakeholders rather than just shareholders’ interests. If a firm faces 
bankruptcy, all stakeholders will critically be affected especially employees. As a 
result, Japanese managers tend to lower the firm’s debt ratio. 
H2: In contrast with managers, shareholders’ incentive for investment is purely 
the return on capital they have invested. One advantage of debt financing is tax 
saving benefit in which payment of interest to lender is tax free and this benefit 
will be returned to the shareholders in the form of capital gain or dividends. In 
addition, large principal shareholders have stronger ability to monitor 
management behavior compared to small dispersed shareholders. One way is to 
increase debt ratio to put pressure on managers to achieve good performance. 
Therefore, this kind of firm should have higher debt ratio than a firm that does not 
have a large principal shareholder. 
H3: Lifetime employment is still common among large Japanese firms [Jackson 
(2007, Ch 10)]. Employees consider this criterion important because, for one 
reason, Japanese firms usually recruit only new graduate which make its hard for 
an employee to seek a new job at a new company. A firm that has financial distress 
or offers uncertain employment will also face hardships in hiring talented 
employees compared to a firm that has a healthy financial and a stable 
employment environment. Thus, a firm should lower its debt ratio to avoid default 
risk. 
H4: Taishoku Kyuyo Hikiatekin (below referred to as TKH) or accrued 
employees retirement benefit is the reserve for the payment for employees upon 
retirement. When a firm faces financial distress, this reserve may be cut 
substantially and as a result the pension fund used to pay for retired employees 
can also be cut, thus employees face the possibility of receiving a lower amount of 
money or losing their pensions completely. One example is Japan Airlines’ case. It 
is facing financial distress (now it is surviving because of the government support) 
and it is working on a restructuring plan. The restructuring plan includes 
downsizing and the cut of pension paid to retired or former JAL employees. The 
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proposal is under negotiation with its retired employees. Therefore, from the point 
of view of employees, the firm should lower its debt ratio to avoid financial 
difficulty because they do not want their retirement benefits to be cut if the firm 
goes bankrupt. 
H5: Lastly, a firm that has concentrated trading partners should lower its debt 
ratio in exchange for future businesses [Cornell and Shapiro (1987); Barton et al 
(1989)]. From the standpoint of clients, if a firm goes bankrupt, then the goods or 
services they have ordered will be canceled or delayed; as a result, this may lead to 
the loss of their own business because they cannot use the ordered goods or 
services to deliver on to their customers on time. Besides, the purchase deposit 
might not be returned. Suppliers also have the same problems as clients, for 
instance, they might not be able to claim the unsettled payment of delivered goods 
or services. For this reason, such a firm is expected to have lower debt ratio. 
 
V- Variables and Data Used in the Analysis  
 
1) Definition of Debt Ratio 
 
In most empirical research, the capital structure of a firm is normally expressed 
by its debt ratio (leverage level) and can be defined in several ways. One commonly 
known way is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. However, total liabilities 
include short-term transaction liabilities such as accounts payable which is not for 
the purpose of financing so it is not a good indicator for explaining a firm’s capital 
structure [Rajan and Zingales (1995)]. The other way is to define the debt ratio as 
the ratio of total debt (the sum of short-term and long-term borrowing plus 
corporate bonds) to capital (total debt plus total equity) [Hirota (1999)].  
In my study, the debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total fixed liabilities to 
capital (total fixed liabilities plus total equity). The reasons are, first, long-term 
borrowing and bonds are included in total fixed liabilities and they are mainly used 
for the purpose of financing. In contrast, short-term borrowing is included in the 
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current liabilities and is similar to accounts or notes payable which is used for 
short-term transactions or short-term funding. Second, fixed liabilities have more 
critical impact on the financial condition of the firms. For example, if a firm issues 
bonds, then it needs to pay out interest periodically and pay out the principal at 
maturity. However, for short-term borrowing, a firm may borrow short-term 
borrowing from other sources (e.g. another bank) to re-finance its old short-term 
borrowing, but a firm may not be able to issue bonds or borrow more long-term 
borrowing when the value of its outstanding bonds or long-term borrowing is 
already sufficiently high. In this case, even if the firm issues more bonds, the 
bonds’ creditability will decrease due to the increase of default risk; thus the bonds 
may not be sold at market prices. For these reasons, I used total fixed liabilities 
rather than total debt in my study (I also performed the regression using total debt, 
but there is no significant change in the result between the two definitions).  
Moreover, market value of debt may probably be a better measure to book value 
but due to the constraint of data for market value of debt and the fact that Bowman 
(1980) shows that the cross-sectional correlation between the book value and 
market value is relatively high, so the error from using book value is consider to be 
very small. Hirota (1999) also shows that no significant change is observed 
between the use of market value and book value in his study. 
Table 1 reports the sample means, medians and standard deviations of debt 
ratio by the three definitions for each fiscal year from 2002 to 2007. (I) defined by 
the ratio of total debt (sum of short-term, long-term borrowing and bonds) to 
capital (total debt plus total equity) multiplied by 100, (II) is defied by total fixed 
liabilities divided by total capital (total fixed liabilities plus total equity) multiplied 
by 100 and (II) is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets multiplied by 100. All 
factors used for the calculation are book value. 
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Table 1: Means of Firms’ Debt ratio 
Fiscal Year: 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
(I) 
Mean 34.598 33.346 31.488 29.263 28.941 29.419 
Median (30.496) (30.547) (28.616) (26.051) (26.167) (26.978) 
Std Dev 24.550 23.390 22.316 21.052 20.832 20.852 
N 941 936 942 935 897 939 
        
(II) 
Mean 28.889 28.261 26.946 25.842 24.63 23.850 
Median (24.599) (24.588) (22.202) (21.489) (20.46) (18.944) 
Std Dev 21.893 21.121 20.525 19.595 19.44 19.656 
N 1099 1113 1134 1142 1100 1158 
        
(III) 
Mean 52.637 51.322 50.186 49.054 48.641 48.113 
Median (52.663) (51.719) (50.351) (49.224) (48.720) (48.188) 
Std Dev 21.597 21.023 20.739 20.129 20.410 20.583 
N 1099 1113 1134 1142 1100 1158 
Note: The table shows the sample means of debt ratio by the three definitions for each fiscal 
year. (I) defined by the ratio of total debt (sum of short-term, long-term borrowing and bonds) to 
capital (total debt plus total equity) multiplied by 100. (II) defined by total fixed liabilities divided by 
total capital (total fixed liabilities plus total equity) multiplied by 100 and (II) is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets multiplied by 100. N is the number of the sample. 
 
From Table 1, debt ratio in definition (III) is highest, around 50% compared to 
(I) around 30% and (II) around 25%. This may be due to the huge amount of 
short-term transaction liabilities that add up to form total liabilities. Debt ratio has 
declined about 5% over the period of this study. For instance, debt ratio in (II) has 
fell from 28.89% in 2002 to 23.85% in 2007. This phenomenon may be due to the 
abundant surplus of internal fund; thus firms’ reliance on bank finance also 
decreases. The other reason may due to the rise of Japanese stock market after the 
lost decade; for instance, the Nikkei Stock Index has risen from 7831.42 in April 
2003 to 12525.54 in March 2008 and peaked at 18138.36 in June 2007 (See figure 
1). During this period, firms may turn to equity finance rather than debt finance. 
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2) Independent Variables 
 
A general corporate finance theory states that a firm decides its financial 
structure to maximize firms’ wealth. With this standard theory, researchers have 
developed many theories and empirical studies regarding a firm’s capital structure. 
Starting from MM (1958, 1963)’s cost of capital model, a wide variety of models 
have been created such as tax shelter and bankruptcy cost model, agency model 
and signaling model. Yet none of them directly focuses on stakeholders who are 
directly involved in contributing to the firm’s sale, profit, decision making, and 
meanwhile directly affected if the firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, my study aims to 
observe the direct impact of stakeholders (shareholders, managers, employees, 
clients and suppliers) on capital structure based on the idea that a firm is made up 
of stakeholders and to maximize a firm’s wealth means to maximize stakeholder’s 
wealth as well.  
Figure 1: Nikkei Stock Index 
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6,000
9,000
12,000
15,000
18,000
21,000
01/11 02/12 04/01 05/02 06/03 07/04 08/06
 
Date 
Note: The figure shows the monthly closing price variation of Nikkei Stock Index from Jan 2002 to May 2008 
Source: Yahoo Finance (Japan) http://table.yahoo.co.jp/t?s=998407.O&g=d 
Access date: December 2009 
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Variables representing shareholders, managers, employees, clients and suppliers 
are used as independent variables for explaining financial decision. In addition, 
Log(sale), Profit, Fixed Assets Ratio which were found to significantly influence 
capital structure are also used as controlling variables for regressing debt ratio. 
They are calculated as below: 
 
DR=Debt Ratio: defined as the ratio of total fixed liabilities to capital (total 
fixed liabilities plus equity) multiplied by 100. 
SH=Shareholders: the percentage of shares held by the first largest 
shareholder. Interest payments for its borrowing can reduce tax payment. 
Therefore, shareholders have the incentive to used debt in order to get the most 
benefit from tax saving. As hypothesize, SH is expected to have positive impact on 
DR. 
EMP=Employees: the average tenure of office is used as a proxy for EMP. I 
reason that, as lifetime employment is still common in Japan, firms which provide 
long term employment are thought to be healthy financially and are able to attract 
talented new employees who will contribute to the firm’s performance. Therefore, 
leverage should be low. 
TKH=also used to represent Employees: is calculated by TKH reserve divided 
by total assets multiplied by 100. Pension paid to retired employees may be cut 
when a firm is facing financial distress or goes bankrupt. To maintain the payment, 
a firm should lower it debt ratio to avoid bankruptcy; thus, TKH should have 
negative effect against DR. 
MH=Managers: the proportion of shares owned by insider managers or 
officials is used to observe managerial influence on debt decision. As pointed out 
by Friend and Lang (1988), managers are at least motivated in part to maximize 
their own interest and that has the incentive to lower debt ratio below the optimal 
to avoid default risk.  
CLT=Clients: the ratio of total accounts receivable and notes receivable 
divided by total sale multiplied by 100. Firms that have close relationship usually 
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use accounts or notes receivable instead of cash for transactions. For this reason, 
this proxy is thought to be appropriate for measuring a firm’s trading partners’ 
concentration. As explained in the hypothesis above, the effect of CLT on DR 
should be negative. 
SUP=Suppliers: the ratio of total accounts payable plus notes payable divided 
by total sales multiplied by 100. Likewise, SUP is expected to have negative sign 
against DR. 
Log(sale)=Size: the logarithm of total sales is used as a proxy for size. Larger 
firms tend to be more diversified and have a lower risk of bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the cost of issuing debt and equity is also lower compared to smaller 
size firms. These mean that a large firm has easier access to debt and therefore has 
higher leverage [Titman and Wessels (1988)].  
PR=Profitability: is calculated by pretax profit divided by total assets 
multiplied by 100. According to the pecking order suggested by Myers (1984), 
firms do fund raising first by internal capital, second by issuing debt and finally by 
issuing new equity. He explains this behavior as the result of cost of issuing equity 
or debt that is high due to transaction costs or asymmetric information [Myers and 
Majluf (1984)]. Therefore, a highly profitable firm is able to self-finance with its 
profit. Hence, a high profitable firm has a lower debt ratio. 
FIXAR=Fixed Asset Ratio: the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total 
assets multiplied by 100. A firm which has high value of fixed assets (land, plants 
or buildings) will have lower bankruptcy costs as these kinds of assets are more 
liquidate and can be sold at the market price. Moreover, fixed assets’ creditability 
also can be used as collateral for borrowing from a bank or issuing secured debt at 
a lower cost. One reason is that a firm has information that outsider investors do 
not, so issuing debt secured by known properties value reduces this cost 
significantly [Myers and Majluf (19984); Scott (1977)]. Thus, firms with huge 
tangible fixed assets which can be used as collateral may use this advantage to 
issue more debt. 
AGE=the Number of Years since Establishment: a proxy to control the 
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average tenure of office for EMP variable. Older firms are considered more stable 
and have a better creditable reputation; thus, this allows them to borrow easier 
and at a lower cost than younger firms. 
 
3) Data 
 
Data used in this empirical study are taken from the Nikkei NEEDS-FAME, 
Nippon Kaihatsu Ginko Kigyo Zaimu Data Banku (Development Bank of Japan, 
Corporate Financial Data Bank) and the Kaishashikiho (Quarterly Corporate 
Reports) data base published by Toyo Keizai Shinposha from fiscal year 
2002-2007. The sample excludes financial institution and includes both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms listed on the first section of Tokyo 
Stock Exchange.  
The sample is restricted to the following conditions:  
 
(1)- Firms that have their financial statements closed in March  
(2)- Firms that have all needed data for the analysis 
   
Factors such as total assets, total liabilities, total capital, total sales, pretax profit, 
accounts and notes receivable, accounts and notes payable are extracted from 
Nikkei NEEDS-FAME. Tangible fixed assets, the proportion held by first largest 
shareholder, proportion held by managerial insiders, the average tenure of office 
are taken from DBJ Corporate Financial Data Bank and the number of years since 
establishment is obtained from the data base of Kaishashikiho. The final numbers 
of firms in each sample year are 1099, 1113, 1134, 1142, 1100 and 1158. Table 2 
presents the summary descriptive statistics of all independent variables in the 
regression. Sample means are presented in the first row of the table and the figures 
in the brackets are the sample medians while figures in the third row of each 
variable are the standard deviations of sample means. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of independent variables 
Fiscal Year: 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
       
DR (%) 28.89 28.26 26.95 25.84 24.63 23.85 
 (24.60) (24.59) (22.20) (21.49) (20.46) (18.94) 
 21.89 21.12 20.52 19.59 19.44 19.66 
SH (%) 16.97 17.43 17.60 17.48 17.24 17.91 
 (10.39) (11.22) (11.19) (10.95) (10.64) (11.24) 
 14.40 14.43 14.74 14.75 14.88 15.25 
SH*SH 494.98 511.74 526.80 522.89 518.42 553.02 
 (107.95) (125.89) (125.10) (119.90) (113.21) (126.34) 
 834.46 866.65 893.73 887.69 886.81 910.07 
EMP (Y) 15.17 15.27 15.30 15.32 15.08 14.89 
 (16.20) (16.40) (16.40) (16.40) (16.00) (16.00) 
 4.91 4.95 4.97 4.94 5.12 4.91 
TKH (%) 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.25 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.11) (0.04) 
 0.62 0.54 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.45 
MH (%) 4.82 4.63 4.31 4.09 3.93 3.60 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) (0.44) (0.40) 
 10.06 9.66 9.09 8.95 8.30 7.88 
MH*MH 124.38 114.58 101.06 96.78 84.34 74.92 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22) (0.20) (0.16) 
 439.45 434.98 388.26 436.60 323.75 296.02 
CLT (%) 24.26 23.98 23.49 23.24 23.12 21.83 
 (25.19) (25.10) (24.68) (24.56) (24.17) (22.58) 
 12.87 12.78 12.91 12.94 13.71 12.82 
SUP (%) 15.04 15.31 14.93 14.93 14.94 13.93 
 (14.27) (14.85) (13.88) (14.05) (13.90) (12.70) 
 8.98 9.27 9.53 9.30 10.08 9.25 
Log(sale) 11.20 11.21 11.25 11.28 11.24 11.26 
 (11.05) (11.09) (11.15) (11.16) (11.12) (11.16) 
 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.48 1.46 
PR (%) 4.13 4.70 5.50 5.63 5.79 5.53 
 (3.14) (3.62) (4.38) (4.63) (4.73) (4.38) 
 4.69 4.71 5.00 4.91 5.46 5.62 
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FIXAR (%) 28.82 27.19 26.27 24.73 24.02 24.79 
 (26.09) (24.86) (23.39) (22.38) (21.19) (22.12) 
 17.71 17.28 17.47 17.10 17.37 17.49 
AGE (Y) 57.57 58.25 58.65 59.38 59.39 60.64 
 (55.00) (56.00) (57.00) (58.00) (58.50) (60.00) 
 20.18 20.48 20.90 20.89 20.86 21.58 
N 1099 1113 1134 1142 1100 1158 
Note: This table reports the sample means of independent variables use in the regression. The figures in the 
brackets are the sample medians and the figures in the third row of each variable are the standard deviations 
of the sample means. DR=the ratio of book value of total fixed liabilities to capital (total fixed liabilities plus 
total equity) multiplied by 100. SH=the percentage of shares held by the first largest shareholder and SH*SH 
is its square. EMP=the average tenure of office. TKH=the ratio of TKH reserve to total assets multiplied by 
100. MH=percentage of shares held by the insider managerial officers and MH*MH is its square. CLT=the 
ratio of sum of accounts and notes receivable to total sales multiplied by 100. SUP=the ratio of sum of 
accounts and notes payable to total sales multiplied by 100. Log(sale)=the logarithm of total sales. PR=the 
ratio of pretax profit to total assets multiplied by 100. FIXAR=the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total 
assets multiplied by 100. AGE=the number of years since establishment. All variables are calculated at the 
end of each fiscal year ended in March. N is the number of the sample. 
 
VI- Estimation Result 
 
In this section, I use the stakeholder variables explained in the last section to 
regress the debt ratio of a firm. I conduct cross-sectional regression for each 
sample year from fiscal year 2002 to 2007 using ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
regression equation is as below: 
 
DR＝a0 + a1SH + a2EMP +a3TKH + a4MH + a5CLT + a6SUP + a7Log(sale)       
+ a8PR + a9FIXAR + a10AGE + U  ( I ) 
 
The result of the estimations is shown in Table 3. 
. 
1) Regression Result of Equation ( I ) 
Table 2: Continued 
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Table 3: Regression Result of Equation ( I )  
Fiscal Year: 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
       
c -7.93   -1.21   2.33   8.74*  -1.74   8.03*  
 -(1.23)   -(0.21)   (0.41)   (1.74)   -(0.40)   (1.71)   
SH -0.064*  -0.059   -0.041   -0.043   -0.058*  -0.084*** 
 -(1.65)   -(1.59)   -(1.17)   -(1.31)   -(1.79)   -(2.68)   
EMP 0.077   0.221   0.087*** 0.317**  0.193   -0.133   
 (0.49)   (1.47)   (2.80)   (2.41)   (1.61)   -(1.08)   
TKH -3.494*** -4.499*** -5.074*** -3.023*** -0.108   -2.967*** 
 -(3.85)   -(4.44)   -(4.76)   -(3.34)   -(0.13)   -(2.67)   
MH 0.068   0.034   0.073   -0.037   -0.071   -0.080   
 (1.01)   (0.52)   (1.07)   -(0.60)   -(1.05)   -(1.21)   
CLT -0.34*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.42*** 
 -(6.00)   -(7.93)   -(8.27)   (5.12)   -(10.22)   -(8.77)   
SUP 0.23*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 
 (2.95)   (5.18)   (4.39)   (5.12)   (4.86)   (3.59)   
Log(sale) 2.86*** 2.22*** 1.74*** 1.35*** 2.46*** 2.32*** 
 (6.21)   (5.20)   (4.24)   (3.58)   (7.13)   (6.57)   
PR -1.34*** -1.16*** -1.07*** -1.21*** -1.13*** -1.21*** 
 -(9.91)   -(9.11)   -(9.77)   -(11.62)   -(12.35)   -(13.07)   
FIXAR 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 
 (11.53)   (11.18)   (10.67)   (11.24)   (10.89)   (11.55)   
AGE 0.09**  0.07**  0.33** 0.05**  0.04*  -0.019   
 (2.51)   (2.07)   (2.30)   (1.87)   (1.68)   -(0.70)   
N 1099   1113   1134   1142   1100   1158   
Note: This table reports the regression results for debt ration on stakeholder and controlling variables. DR=the ratio 
of book value of total fixed liabilities to capital (total fixed liabilities plus total capital) multiplied by 100. SH=percentage 
of shares held by the first largest shareholder. EMP=the average tenure of office. TKH=the ratio of TKH reserve to 
total assets multiplied by 100. MH=percentage of shares held by insider managerial officers. CLT=the ratio of sum 
of accounts and notes receivable to total sales multiplied by 100. SUP=the ratio of sum of accounts and notes 
payable to total sales multiplied by 100. Log(sale)=logarithm of total sales. PR=pretax profit divided by total assets 
multiplied by 100. FIXAR=total tangible fixed assets divided by total assets multiplied by 100. AGE=the number of 
years of establishment. N is the number of sample. All variables are calculated at the end of each fiscal year ended 
in March. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significant level of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The 
figures in brackets are t value. Ordinary lease square method is used for the regression. 
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Table 3 reports the results of regression of debt ratio on five stakeholder 
variables and four controlling variables. First, I examine the impact of stakeholder 
variables (SH, EMP, MH, CLT and SUP) on debt ratio.  
SH: shows negative sign for the whole periods but is significant only for the 
fiscal year 2002, 2006 and 2007 at 10%, 10% and 5% level respectively. This result 
is in contrast with my hypothesis that shareholders are motivated to increase debt 
ratio in order to gain tax benefit by paying interest expenses. This may suggest that 
Japanese shareholders act differently from the United States’. They may hold the 
share for a long-term and expect constant capital gain rather than short-term 
return, or their interest coincides with that of other stakeholders (e.g. employee), 
i.e. to avoid bankruptcy costs. Another explanation may suggest that this happens 
due to the feature of ownership structure in Japanese firms which hold mutual 
cross-shareholding of their trading partners or related firms in the same group. 
These inter-firm shareholders tend to hold the share not because of short-term 
capital gain, but for expected higher dividend, building long-term trust in order to 
gain future businesses and protect each other from hostile takeover. Bankruptcy 
may be costly for a firm that possesses the buyer-supplier relationship. In case of 
bankruptcy, the firm not only losses their investment (shares) but it also means the 
loss of business as well. For this reason, they may be motivated to lower the debt 
ratio to avoid such costs.   
EMP: shows positive sign toward DR in almost all fiscal years except for 2007. 
This also contrasts with my hypothesis. However, only fiscal years 2004 and 2005 
are significant at 1% and 5% level. This result suggests that for a firm possessing 
longer average tenure of office, can be an indicator that represents it as a stable 
workplace with lower risk of downsizing (or financial distress). Therefore, for job 
security reasons, employees still have the incentive to work at this kind of firm and 
trading partners can expect for longer future transactions with the firm.  
TKH: is negative sign as predicted in the hypothesis and highly significant at 1% 
level, except for fiscal year 2006 which is negative but not significant. This 
suggests that a firm that considers the benefit of its employees should increase 
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TKH reserve and lower its debt level to avoid bankruptcy.  
MH: shows both positive and negative signs but none of them is significant. 
This may suggest that because the manager has information which sometimes is 
not available to investors, he may be motivated to adjust the debt level in such a 
way that maximizes his interest; that is, to increases or decreases debt ratio 
according to the proportion he is holding.  
CLT: shows negative sign as predicted in the hypothesis and all strongly 
significant at 1% level throughout the whole sample years. This suggests that the 
debt ratio of a firm is influenced by the nature of transactions with its partners. 
The higher the concentration of transaction, the lower the debt ratio should it 
possess.  
SUP: with the same logic of thinking as in the case of CLT, SUP should be 
negative, but it shows positive sign and strongly significant in all periods. 
Nonetheless, this puzzling result may cause by the difference of bargaining power 
between clients/consumers and suppliers. Clients/consumers can choose suppliers 
or buy from any sellers. The choices increase particularly in products that have 
many manufactures or are highly competitive. In this case, a firm is a client, thus 
has strong bargain power over its suppliers. Even if one supplier refuses the deal, it 
can switch to other suppliers. Consequently, higher bargaining power may lead a 
firm to possess higher debt level. 
Second, I examine the controlling variables (Log(sale), PR, FIXAR and AGE) to 
see if the theory and empirical results used to interpret capital structure for United 
States firms are also applicable to Japanese firms after the corporate governance 
reform and the loosen of regulation on bond issuing in 1990s. From Table 3, all the 
controlling variables, (Log(sale), PR, FIXAR and AGE), are statistically significant 
and show the predicted sign for the whole period. Log(sale), PR, FIXAR are 
strongly significant at 1% level throughout the periods of study. From this result, 
factors such as firm size (Total sales) and profitability that are said to have 
influence on firm financial decision in the United States also have strong impact on 
Japanese firm as well.  
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From the result in Table 3, SH and MH seem to have changed their behavior 
according to the proportion they are holding. In other words, managers’ and 
shareholders’ behavior might be a quadratic function to debt ratio. The hypothesis 
here is that, first, managers and shareholders decrease debt ratio but when the 
proportion of their holding reaches the threshold (vertex of the parabola), they will 
increase the debt ratio. One reason is probably because up from this turning point, 
the tax-saving gain from interest payment is substantially higher than bankruptcy 
costs, the fact that motivates managers and shareholders to increase debt in order 
to gain the utmost of this advantage. 
Therefore, I re-conducted the regression to examine this effect by including 
SH*SH (the square of SH) and MH*MH (the square of MH) into equation ( I ) 
above. The regression equation is as below: 
 
DR＝a0 + a1SH + a2SH*SH + a3EMP +a4TKH + a5MH + a6MH*MH + a7CLT      
+ a8SUP + a9Log(sale) + a10PR + a11FIXAR + a12AGE + U ( II ) 
 
The result of regression of equation ( II ) is shown in Table 4. 
 
2) Regression Result of Equation ( II ) 
 
The result is shown in Table 4 while Table 5, Panel A and Panel B show the 
thresholds of SH and MH respectively. The threshold of SH is calculated by using 
the coefficients of SH and SH*SH (coefficient of SH divided by the product of 2 
and coefficient of SH*SH) and the threshold of MH is calculated by using the 
coefficients of MH and MH*MH (coefficient of MH divided by the product of 2 and 
coefficient of MH*MH) from Table 4. Left hand side and Right hand side show the 
percentage of firms located on the left and right hand side of the thresholds 
respectively. The figures in the brackets are the number of firms on each side of the 
thresholds.  
From the result of the regression of equation ( II ) in Table 4, the following effects 
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of stakeholder variables are observed. 
SH: shows negative effect on debt ratio for the whole periods as in the 
regression result of equation (I) but the number of significant coefficients 
increased from two (2006 and 2007) to four (2002, 2003, 2006 and 2007) and the 
level of significance also increased from 10% and 5% to 5% and 1%.  
SH*SH: throughout the whole samples, it has positive sign against debt ratio, but 
only three years are significant (2003, 2006 and 2007) at 10% significance level. 
Nonetheless, by looking at the thresholds of SH in Panel A of Table 5, in fiscal year 
2002, over 90% of the firms in the samples located on the left hand side of 
thresholds and in 2004 and 2005, 100% of firms were on the left hand side of the 
thresholds. This result suggests that the first largest shareholders in Japanese 
firms tend to decrease debt ratio until the proportion held is higher than the 
thresholds. The finding suggests that the impact of shareholders on debt ratio is in 
the form of quadratic function in which the parabola opens upward. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Result of Equation ( II ) 
Fiscal Year 2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   
       
c -1.26   2.61   8.30   11.04**  5.76   14.05*** 
 -(0.19)   (0.43)   (1.41)   (2.06)   (1.26)   (2.88)   
SH -0.275** -0.276** -0.128   -0.064   -0.297** -0.324*** 
 -(2.00)   -(2.14)   -(1.02)   (0.11)   -(2.42)   -(2.67)   
SH*SH 0.003   0.004*  0.001   0.000   0.003*  0.004*  
 (1.35)   (1.68)   (0.39)   (0.11)   (1.69)   (1.82)   
EMP -0.041   0.189   0.202   0.266**  0.077   -0.118   
 -(0.25)   (1.23)   (1.40)   (1.97)   (0.64)   -(0.97)   
TKH -2.883*** -4.234*** -4.402*** -2.809*** 0.039   -2.016*  
 -(3.13)   -(4.11)   -(4.11)   -(3.07)   (0.05)   -(1.79)   
MH -0.409**  -0.093   -0.467*** -0.226*  -0.71*** -0.693*** 
 -(2.40)   -(0.62)   -(2.99)   -(1.77)   -(4.48)   -(4.15)   
MH*MH 0.011*** 0.003   0.013*** 0.004*  0.02*** 0.018*** 
 (3.12)   (1.08)   (3.87)   (1.71)   (4.63)   (4.20)   
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Table 4: Continued 
CLT -0.35*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.43*** 
 -(6.10)   -(8.00)   -(8.43)   -(9.39)   -(10.32)   -(9.14)   
SUP 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 
 (3.08)   (5.18)   (4.69)   (5.17)   (5.21)   (3.77)   
Log(sale) 2.72*** 2.15*** 1.61*** 1.28*** 2.25*** 2.03*** 
 (5.90)   (5.03)   (3.91)   (3.38)   (6.58)   (5.70)   
PR -1.34*** -1.16*** -1.06*** -1.20*** -1.10*** -1.18*** 
 -(9.94)   -(9.12)   -(9.74)   -(11.59)   -(12.08)   -(12.80)   
FIXAR 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (11.79)   (11.23)   (10.84)   (11.32)   (11.41)   (11.71)   
AGE 0.07**  0.06*   0.07**  0.05*   0.03   -0.021   
 (2.07)   (1.83)   (2.34)   (1.66)   (1.11)   -(0.74)   
N 1099   1113   1134   1142   1100   1158   
Note: This table reports the regression results for debt ratio on stakeholder and controlling 
variables. DR=the ratio of book value of total fixed liabilities to capital (total fixed liabilities plus total 
equity) multiplied by 100. SH=the percentage of shares held by the first largest shareholder and 
SH*SH is the square of SH. EMP=the average tenure of office. TKH=the ratio of TKH reserve to total 
assets multiplied by 100. MH=the percentage of shares held by insider managerial officers and 
MH*MH is the square of MH. CLT=the ratio of sum of accounts and notes receivable to total sales 
multiplied by 100. SUP=the ratio of sum of accounts and notes payable to total sales multiplied by 
100. Log(sale)=the logarithm of total sales. PR=the ratio of pretax profit to total assets multiplied 
by 100. FIXAR=the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total assets multiplied by 100. AGE=the 
number of years since establishment. N is the number of the sample. All variables are calculated 
at the end of each fiscal year ended in March. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significant level of 
coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The figures in brackets are t value. Ordinary lease 
square method is used for the regression. 
 
 
The reason of lowering the debt ratio may due to the characteristics of Japanese 
firms that hold mutual cross-shareholding of their business partners. Thus, 
bankruptcy cost is high since they will lose both the equity and the businesses. This 
result is different from the American shareholders yet interesting since American 
shareholders are capital gain investors. If the firm goes bankrupt, their loss is 
limited “going for broke” and do not have any other costs which are associated 
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with business partners.   
MH: in contrast with the results in the regression of equation (I), MH shows 
negative sign and it is significant toward debt ratio, except for fiscal year 2003 
which is not statistically significant.  
MH*MH: is positive and significant for the whole periods of the study 
except fiscal year 2003 which is not significant. Similar to shareholders, this 
finding suggests that the managers has the incentive to lower debt ratio to 
avoid default risk but when their holding reaches a certain level (the 
threshold), they tend to increase debt ratio. This is clear when checking the 
proportion of firms located on each side of the thresholds which is reported 
in Panel B in Table 5. The thresholds’ value range from 14.66 to 28.66 but 
constantly over 89% of firms are situated on the left hand side of these 
thresholds. 
EMP: the coefficient of EMP in 2002 and 2007 shows negative sign and for 
the rest of the years it still has positive sign but only fiscal year 2005 is 
significant. Because it is not significant in almost all cases, the result suggests 
that the average tenure of office has no impact on debt ratio and it has no any 
relationship with a firm’s financial decision at all. Instead, it may serve as an 
advantage to attract talented employees (higher average tenure may equal job 
security or lifetime employment). Therefore, EMP is not an appropriate 
indicator to represent employees for studying the impact of employees on 
capital structure of a firm.  
TKH: as in equation ( I ), coefficients of TKH are significantly negative except 
for the fiscal year 2006 that is positive but not significant. This result is supporting 
my hypothesis. 
CLT and SUP: as in the regression of equation ( I ), coefficients of CLT are 
negative and strongly significant at 1% level in all periods. In contrast, coefficients 
of SUP still have positive sign and are statistically significant in the whole sample 
years. 
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Table 5: The thresholds of SH and MH 
Fiscal Year 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Panel A SH 
Threshold 43.54  38.74  79.20  151.63  43.16  43.88  
Left hand side 91.90% 88.95% 100.00% 100.00% 91.00% 90.67% 
 (1010)  (990)  (1134)  (1142)  (1001)  (1050)  
Right hand side 8.10% 11.05% 0.00% 0.00% 9.00% 9.33% 
 (89)  (123)  (0)  (0)  (99)  (108)  
N 1099  1113  1134  1142  1100  1158  
       
Fiscal Year 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Panel B MH 
Threshold 18.71  14.66  18.51  28.66  20.65  19.22  
Left hand side 91.54% 88.95% 92.33% 96.94% 95.18% 95.37% 
 (1006)  (990)  (1047)  (1107)  (1047)  (1104)  
Right hand side 8.46% 11.05% 7.67% 3.06% 4.82% 6.66% 
 (93)  (123)  (87)  (35)  (53)  (54)  
N 1099  1113  1134  1142  1100  1158  
Note: The table reports the thresholds of SH and MH. Panel A and Panel B show the thresholds of 
SH and MH respectively. The threshold of SH is calculated by using the coefficients of SH and 
SH*SH (coefficient of SH divided by the product of 2 and SH*SH) and the threshold of MH is 
calculated by using the coefficients of MH and MH*MH (coefficient of MH divided by the product of 
2 and MH*MH) from Table 4. Left hand side and Right hand side show the percentage of firms 
located on the left and right hand side of the thresholds respectively. The figures in the brackets 
are the number of firms on each side of the thresholds. N represents the number of the samples. 
 
For the controlling variables, Log(sale), PR and FIXAR are significant at 1% level 
and show the predicted hypothesis sign. The variable AGE, except for fiscal year 
2006 and 2007 has positive sign but not significant, also has significant positive 
sign against debt ratio.  
In sum, shareholders and managerial holders tend to decrease the debt ratio 
until their holding proportion reaches the threshold point. Up from this threshold 
point, the debt ratio is expected to be increased. Average tenure of office does not 
show significant impact on debt ratio which suggest that it has no relation with 
 37 
capital structure, while TKH is negative and significant against debt ratio, thus can 
be an indicator representing employees in a firm’s financial decision. Clients show 
negative sign as predicted while suppliers show the reverse sign but both strongly 
significant throughout the whole period. Finally, controlling variables also show 
the hypothesis sign and are significant except for AGE which has insignificant 
statistical level for the fiscal year 2006. 
 
3) Economic Impact of Stakeholder and Controlling Variables on 
Debt Ratio 
 
  In this section, I examine the economic impact of each stakeholder and 
controlling variables have on a firm’s capital structure. In the previous 
section, I found that almost both the stakeholders and controlling variables 
are all statistically significant. However, which variables and to what extent 
do they have an influence on capital structure is still not observed. Here, 
therefore I estimate how one standard deviation change in each independent 
variable has an impact on debt ratio. The impact is calculated by using the 
estimated coefficients of each variable in Table 4 multiplied by one standard 
deviation of each variable in Table 2 and Average reports the means of each 
variable.  
The estimated result is shown in Table 6. Among stakeholder variables, CLT 
has the greatest impact on leverage ratio. For instance, in 2006, one standard 
deviation increase of CLT may decrease leverage by 6.39 percentage points. 
Following by MH and SH which both in average, one standard deviation 
change can lower debt ratio by 3.77 and 3.36 percent respectively. For TKH, 
though it is significantly negative toward debt ratio, its ability to lower debt 
ratio is small compared to other stakeholders. Meanwhile, SUP that has 
positive impact on leverage may increase the debt ratio by only half the ability 
of CLT to lower debt ratio. This suggests that CLT bargaining power is 
superior to SUP.  
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For controlling variables, FIXAR has the highest economic impact as well as PR 
on debt ratio. For example, one standard deviation change in FIXAR can increase 
debt ratio by 6.02 percentage points and PR can decrease leverage by 5.93 
percentage points. 
  From this estimation results, a firm’s leverage decision is based mainly on the 
nature of its managers, shareholders and clients as well as profitability and asset’s 
structure followed by suppliers and total sales. Employees also are considered but 
not as important as other stakeholders and their impact is small, at about 0.91 to 
2.29 percentage points (excluding fiscal year 2006).  
 
 
Table 6: Estimated Impact of Stakeholder and Controlling Variables on Leverage 
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
 Stakeholder Variables 
SH -3.96 -3.99 -1.89 -0.95 -4.41 -4.95 -3.36 
SH*SH 2.64 3.09 0.72 0.19 3.05 3.36 2.17 
EMP -0.20 0.93 1.01 1.31 0.40 -0.58 0.48 
TKH -1.79 -2.29 -2.16 -1.49 0.02 -0.91 -1.43 
MH -4.11 -0.90 -4.24 -2.02 -5.88 -5.46 -3.77 
MH*MH 4.80 1.38 4.89 1.72 5.56 5.34 3.95 
CLT -4.46 -5.59 -5.72 -5.99 -6.39 -5.57 -5.62 
SUP 2.15 3.51 3.07 3.20 3.24 2.34 2.92 
 Controlling Variables 
Log(sale) 3.67 2.93 2.20 1.77 3.33 2.96 2.81 
PR -6.28 -5.46 -5.29 -5.91 -5.99 -6.65 -5.93 
FIXAR 7.03 6.33 5.85 5.68 5.55 5.66 6.02 
AGE 1.45 1.25 1.52 1.02 0.60 -0.44 0.90 
Note: The table reports the economic impact of each stakeholder and controlling variables on 
debt ratio by estimating how one standard deviation change in each independent variable 
influences debt ratio. The impact is calculated by using the estimated coefficients of each 
variable in Table 4 multiplied by one standard deviation of each variable in Table 2. Average is 
the means value of each variable 
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VII- Testing for Robustness 
   
In this section, I briefly examine the stability and test the robustness of the result 
in section VI by estimating the pooling regression for all the samples in addition to 
cross-sectional regressions for each sample year.   
 
1) Stability of Variables over Time 
 
  From the results in Table 4, the statistically significant coefficients of 
stakeholder variables SH, TKH and MH appear to be constant over time while 
those that are not significant are very small. For instance, coefficient of TKH in 
fiscal year 2006 is 0.04 compared to other fiscal years which range from -4.4 to 
-2.0. Furthermore, the coefficients of CLT and SUP are more stable, because the 
different between the biggest and smallest is within 0.1. Meanwhile, controlling 
variables also appear to be stable over time. Differences between the biggest and 
the smallest coefficients of Log(sale), PR, FIXAR and AGE are 1.4, 0.2, 0.07 and 
0.09 respectively.  
  Though a statistical test is needed to test whether the coefficient of each variable 
is constant over time, since coefficients of most variables’ variation are relatively 
small, I conclude that at least during the period of study (2002 t0 2007), the  
relationship between leverage and stakeholder and controlling variables is stable.  
 
2) Pooling Regression 
 
  In addition to cross-sectional regression shown in Table 4, I conducted another 
regression using panel data. There are six data sets in my study, fiscal year 2002 to 
2007. I combined all this data together and performed the pooling regression of 
equation (I) and (II) again to check the robustness of empirical evidence on 
cross-sectional regressions.  
There are 6747 firms for performing pooling regression, but this panel data 
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is unbalanced because the number of firms in each sample year is different 
(the maximum is 6 and minimum is 1). The regression result is reported in 
Table 7. 
  Comparing to the results in Table 4, it can be observed that the pooling 
regression of equation ( I ) and ( II ) show strongly significant results for both 
stakeholder and controlling variables. They are all significant at 1% level, and 
show the same sign as in the cross-sectional regression. However, EMP is 
negative but not significant. Therefore, I can confidentially conclude that EMP 
or the average tenure of office does not have any relevance to a firm’s financial 
decision.  
  Adding this pooling regression of panel data to cross-sectional analysis in the 
previous section, stakeholder variables (TKH, MH and CLT) have shown the 
predicted sign of the hypotheses as well as the controlling variables. As a result, I 
can conclude from this finding that stakeholders do have an impact on a firm’s 
capital structure decision. Nonetheless, SUP shows positive sign in all cases which 
contrasted with my hypothesis.  
Finally, although all variables show the sign as in the cross-sectional 
regression, SH becomes positive and SH*SH becomes negative which are 
inverse with the sign in cross-sectional regression. This result may cause from, 
first, as the data used in the pooling regression consist of only six fiscal years 
and some variables may be constant or change very little over the period; thus 
this leads to the change of coefficients of some variables to become insignificant 
or inverse sign. Second, there is a possibility that by using penal data in the 
regression on capital structure may yield result that differs from cross-sectional 
regression result [Hirota (1999)]. Therefore, more empirical test on capital 
structure using panel data is needed in order to have further understanding of 
debt and equity choice of a firm.  
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Table 7: Pooling Regression Result 
 (I) (II) 
 Coefficient t value Coefficient t value 
c -5.513*** -(2.64) -0.215   -(0.10) 
SH 0.159*** (12.19) 0.412*** (21.41) 
SH*SH   -0.007*** -(18.73) 
EMP -0.005   -(0.16) -0.031   -(1.13) 
TKH -0.566*** -(12.96) -1.287*** -(22.38) 
MH -0.073*** -(2.62) -0.495*** -(8.19) 
MH*MH   0.010*** (7.82) 
CLT -0.397*** -(18.85) -0.376*** -(18.33) 
SUP 0.249*** (8.52) 0.208*** (7.28) 
Log(sale) 2.439*** (15.45) 2.000*** (12.85) 
PR -1.300*** -(29.71) -1.198*** -(27.93) 
FIXAR 0.333*** (26.52) 0.321*** (26.20) 
AGE 0.111*** (9.59) 0.112*** (9.83) 
N    6747       6747  
Note: The table shows the pooling regression result of panel data for all sample years from fiscal 
year 2002 to 2007. ( I ) and ( II ) are the regressions of equation ( I ) and ( II ) respectively. 
 
 
 3) Checking for the Outliers of SH and MH 
 
In the estimation result in section VI, the square of SH and MH were found 
significant. This means that SH (MH) has negative impact on DR and the 
relationship between SH (MH) and DR is a quadratic function. However, in a firm 
where SH (or MH) is extremely large and DR is also large may also lead to the 
observation of quadratic relationship between SH (MH) and DR.  
To check this problem, I checked for the outliers of SH and MH. First, I 
calculated the value OSH (OMH) of which equals the sum of means of SH (MH) plus 
its standard deviation multiplied by 3. Second, for firms that their SH (MH) is 
bigger than OSH (OMH), then I check whether their DR is also extremely large. For 
example, in fiscal year 2002, the value of OSH is 60.17% and 16 firms have SH 
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bigger than OSH, but their DR ranged from 2.82% to 70.3% which are all smaller 
than the maximum value of DR (89%). Meanwhile, the value of OMH is 35% and 33 
firms had MH bigger than OMH, but their DR ranged from 0.07% to 68.2% which 
are also smaller than the maximum value of DR (89%). Similar results are also 
observed in other fiscal years for both the SH and MH (except for SH in fiscal year 
2002 which had SH bigger than OSH and their DR ranged from 3.6% to 
99%=maximum value). Furthermore, I also did the same process using two 
standard deviations and the results still remain unchanged. Therefore, I can 
conclude that the relationship between SH (MH) and DR is a quadratic function.    
 
VIII- Limitations and Future Research 
 
  First, this study covers only firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Though the sample consists of both firms in the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industry, they are top-end, major and leading corporation of 
Japan in term of capital, sales, number of employees and so on. Thus, it remains 
unclear whether the findings in this study may also be applicable to small and 
medium corporations and this is why further empirical test on those firms is 
needed. In contrast with large firms that can finance themselves by issuing 
corporate bonds or equity, small and medium firms still rely mainly on banks for 
finance, particularly venture businesses. By including such firm in the analysis, it 
may yield somewhat interesting result. 
  Second, this study excludes banks which also play a very important role in a 
firm’s capital structure. Loan from banks is the only source of finance for those 
firms that do not have access to issue corporate bonds or equity. Especially, 
Japanese banks do not only provide loans but are also one of the largest holders of 
a firm’s outstanding equity. Banks also function as a key for firm restructuring by 
providing the means to avoid filing for formal bankruptcy which is costly. Thus, 
what kind of firms use more debt financing and what kind of firms use more equity 
financing and how bank-firm relationship has an impact on a firm’s debt ratio is an 
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interesting topic for future empirical study.  
  Third, most factors (variables) used to represent stakeholders to examine their 
impact on financial structure were found significant. However, more tests are 
needed, for example, whether they are also significant when applied to firms listed 
on other Japanese capital markets or unlisted firms.  
  Finally, the variable SUP was significant but shows reverse sign compared to my 
hypothesis. This may be because the use of this factor to represent the suppliers is 
inappropriate. Therefore, further consideration on firm-supplier relationship is 
also an important question for future research. 
 
IX- Conclusions 
 
  Japanese firms have some features that are different from firms in other 
capitalist economies. It is said that, Japanese firms’ objective is to maximize all 
stakeholders’ interests rather than just the ones of shareholders. Therefore, in this 
paper, I used Japanese data to test the impacts of stakeholders on firm’s debt ratio. 
I found some interesting results as follows: 
1) First, the largest Japanese shareholder (SH) in a firm has negative impact on 
debt ratio. First largest shareholder usually is a cross-shareholder that has strong 
mutual ties such as in a buyer-supplier relationship. Bankruptcy means the loss of 
both equity value and of the business; thus there is the incentive to lower debt ratio 
in order to avoid these costs. This finding shows the difference between Japanese 
and American shareholders. American shareholders usually increase debt ratio to 
gain the utmost benefit of tax-saving effect or reduce free cash flow to prevent 
managers from investing in self-interest projects.  
2) Managers (MH) have negative effect on leverage. One thing that motivates 
Japanese managers to lower debt ratio is because most of them are in-house 
promoted managers who have spent many years within the firm, and climbed 
through a long career ladder. If the firm goes bankrupt, their years of effort 
become useless as they may be replaced.   
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Nevertheless, when the proportion held by shareholders and managers reaches a 
certain point (the threshold), debt ratio is expected to be increased. That is, the 
relationship between shareholders/managers and debt ratio is a quadratic function 
in which the parabola opens upward.  
3) Firms that consider employees’ interest have lower debt level. The factor 
representing employees, TKH, has negative impact on leverage but its economic 
impact is the smallest compared to other stakeholders’ factors.  
4) The client, CLT, factor also has negative effect on leverage. This is because 
clients have strong bargaining power over the firm (i.e. the ability to choose one 
firm among many). For example, if the firm goes bankrupt, the supplying of parts 
or services may also be stopped or cut. In this case, the client bears all these costs. 
As a result, before buying a product or using a service, he will choose the one with 
the lowest default risk, particularly, when it is dealing with durable products. 
5) Suppliers (SUP), however, show positive sign toward debt ratio which inverse 
with my hypothesis. This puzzling result may suggest that, suppliers have weak 
bargaining power with the firm (i.e. the firm may be chosen among many other 
competitors). In other words, a firm takes the position as a client who is be able to 
choose one supplier among many. Therefore, the reverse hypothesis is that, the 
stronger the bargaining power a firm has with its suppliers, the higher the debt 
ratio can be. Further empirical study is necessary to clarify the relationship 
between the suppliers and a firm’s debt. One suggestion to solve this problem is by 
dividing the sample into two groups, one is business to business (B to B) group and 
the other is business to consumer (B to C) group. In B to B group, the relationship 
is likely to continue or last for a long period. In this group financial distress should 
be considered. Whereas, in B to C group, the transaction may not be permanent or 
be just a spot transaction, thus the suppliers do not care too much about that firm’s 
financial condition. 
6) Finally, the real factors such as firm size, profitability and asset’s structure 
are also significant in explaining Japanese firms’ capital structure. This result is 
consistent with Hirota (1999). Adding to his finding, my result suggests that real 
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factors in capital structure theory developed in the United States also have 
compatible power to explain Japanese firms’ financial decisions after the post 
bubble Japanese economy.  
  In sum, though more empirical tests of the impact of stakeholders on capital 
structure are needed, this paper shows that, besides real factors, stakeholders also 
have a crucial role in firms’ decisions to choose between debt and equity.  
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